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OVER ONE BILLION TONS OF COAL IN 1985:
CAN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY HANDLE IT?
Larry C. Peppers
Creighton University
Omaha, Nebraska

Abstract
Any evaluation of our country's resource potential must carefully
consider the transport network and the constraints which it places
upon future energy development and growth. The federal government
has a vague goal of energy independence (or, at least, less energy
dependence), but it has not developed a coherent energy plan— a
critical element of which is energy transport. The paper analyzes
the uncertain coal outlook facing the rail industry, translates
these coal scenarios into alternative financial projections for
the rail sector, and clarifies the most urgent federal decisions
needed in the energy-transport policy matrix. The rail industry
is being asked to make substantial long-run financial commitments
even though it is unclear how much coal will be produced and what
the intermodal split will be between rail, truck, pipeline, and
barge. Such uncertainty raises the specter of numerous railroads
chasing after the same coal transport business. The success of
any coal-centered energy policy is, therefore, directly linked to
the federal government's ability to simultaneously formulate an
internally consistent set of national energy and transportation
policies.
It is shown that failure to consider the energy-induced
pitfalls facing the railroad industry could lead to severe finan
cial strain on the "strong" Western roads, and thus a counter
productive energy policy.
1.

transportation plan for that segment of

A COAL RENAISSANCE

the freight transportation industry which
On July 26, 1975, the United States Rail

has been most repeatedly on the verge of

way Association (USRA) released its Final

financial collapse during the postwar

System Plan (FSP) for restructuring rail

period— the nation's Class I railroads.

roads in the Northeast and Midwest (12).

As such, it will have a tremendous long-

Following up the recommendations con

run impact on both transportation and

tained in the FSP, President Ford signed
(on February

6

energy planning.

, 1976) a $6.4 billion

Table 1 highlights the

postwar stagnation experienced by the

rail-aid bill designed to underwrite the

railroad industry.

creation (as of April 1, 1976) of the

Total ton-miles of

rail freight grew only 45 percent over

governmentally funded company known as

the period from 1950 to 1973 (a compound

Consolidated Rail Corporation (ConRail).

rate of approximately 1.6 percent).

The FSP should be viewed as a de facto
752

As

shown in Column (2) of Table 1, ton-miles

(Table 2 continued)

per dollar of real GNP fell from 1.655 in
1950 to 0.944 in 1975— a forty-three

Source:

percent decline.

See (6 ).

The freight transportation outlook which
TABLE 1

emerges in the FSP for the next ten years,

TON-MILES OF RAIL FREIGHT
TRANSPORTED DURING THE POSTWAR PERIOD

therefore, is one of high rail dependence
on coal growth.

The forecasted resurgence

in national rail freight demand (and, also,
U.S.
RAIL
TON-MILES
(Billions)
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

TON-MILES
PER $ OF
REAL GNP

ConRail demand) is quickly dissipated if
the coal growth proves to be a mirage.

If

the FSP presents an accurate picture of

588
623
572
697
764
739
776
852
854
753

1.655
1.422
1.173
1.128
1.057
0.990
0.979
1.015
1.039
0.944

future rail freight demand, any significant
shifts in federal policy (affecting either
the level of coal production or the method
of transportation) will have an immediate
and pronounced impact on the rail trans
port sector.

It is increasingly apparent

that the failure of the rail sector to
experience the expected resurgence in coal

Source:

See (1).

tonnage will significantly increase the

Contrasted with this decidedly low growth

likelihood that the ConRail system will be

profile, Table 2 highlights the growth

permanently appended to the United States

outlook contained in the FSP.

Treasury and that the national rail

Between

1973 and 1980 total rail tonnage

system will be financially stagnant.

originations are projected to climb

2.

COAL PRODUCTION IN 1985

132.1 million tons, with coal growing
For the period from

While a multitude of problems are evident

1980 to 1985, the relative importance of

in surveying the uncertain energy outlook

coal as a growth catalyst is diminished

and assessing the impact on the rail

(coal provides

transport sector, there is no dearth of

112.1 million tons.

1 0 1 . 2

million tons out of

a total increase of 277 million), but

coal production forecasts.

coal remains the largest absolute source

summarizes the range of projections for

of tonnage growth.

national coal production.

If coal growth is

Table 3
In comparison

eliminated, aggregate rail tonnage grows

with approximately 650 million tons of

approximately

coal produced in 1975, Table 3 displays

2

percent a year between

a range from 738 to 1,376 million tons in

1980 and 1985.

1980 and from 930 to 2,063 million tons
TABLE 2

in 1985.

RAIL TONNAGE GROWTH:
1973-1985
(Millions of Tons)

At one extreme, coal is project

ed to grow only 43 percent in ten years
while at the other it is forecasted to
jump by 217 percent.

COAL

1973

1980

1985

Tons

Tons

Tons

375.7

487.8

589

NON-COAL

1,158.8

1,178.8

1,354

TOTAL

1,534.5

1

,6

6 6 . 6

The transport sector

is thus faced with a highly variable coal
demand picture over the next ten years.
It is being asked to make substantial
long-run financial commitments even

1,943
753

though it is unclear how much coal will

projection.

be produced and how the coal will be

arisen a multitude of problems resulting

On the supply side, there has

transported (via rail, pipeline, truck, or

from environmental concerns, legislative
inaction, wildcat strikes, and factor

barge).

bottlenecks.

TABLE 3

On the demand side, there

is also a controversy raging over the

ALTERNATIVE FORECASTS OF
NATIONAL COAL PRODUCTION

long-term growth rate for energy demand.
The low-side estimate of 896 million tons

(Millions of Tons)

of coal in 1985 incorporates approximate
1980

production over the next ten years, less

Temple, Barker
& Sloane*
Office of Coal Research*
5% Growth
3.5% Growth
Project Independence*
Business as Usual
Intermediate
Accelerated

ly a 3% compound rate of growth in coal

1985

738
879
785
895
950
1,376

National Petroleum
Council

845

1,028

than half the growth rate incorporated in
the FSP.

1 , 1 2 1

930

The last two rows in Table 4 contain the
specific coal forecasts underlying the

1 , 1 0 0

FSP.

1 , 2 0 0

2,063

At the national level, rail

originations of coal are projected to
climb by roughly

2 0 0

million tons, with

1 , 0 0 1

the increase equally divided between the

Task Group on Coal
Supply Potential*

856

MITRE Corp.*

855

972

Bureau of Mines*

806

998

1974 to 1980 and the 1980 to 1985 sub

*Listed in order, the sources are:
(11), (9), (10), (5), (4), (8 ).

periods. Note that the rail share of
national coal production is expected to
remain basically level between 1974 and

(12),

1980, but is projected to decline nine
percentage points by 1985.

Faced with this range of basic diversity

Prior to 1980

the artificial demand for low-sulfur coal

in coal production estimates, we have

(the direct result of policy decisions

chosen the following four production

pertaining to environmental standards)

scenarios to use in the rail demand

stimulates Western coal, which is much

analysis given below:

less subject to intermodal competition.
COAL PRODUCTION FORECASTS
(Millions of Tons)
1980
773
738
806
950

Low
Final System Plan
Bureau of Mines
Project Independence

After 1980, it was assumed in the FSP
that there would be more balanced growth

1885
896
1,028
998

in coal production with Eastern coal
(which has a higher sulpher content than
Western) rebounding due to the appearance

1 , 2 0 0

of more efficient scrubbers (the use of

Compared to Table 3, these projections

which may be federally mandated).

may appear conservative, but they do more
accurately reflect the current assessment

is projected to drop

of problems faced by the coal sector in
achieving rapid growth.

1 , 2 0 0

When the FSP was

percentage

percentage points can be directly
attributed to a 25 million ton slurry

million tons of

pipeline carrying coal to utilities in

coal in 1985 was considered to be an
attainable policy target.

8 . 8

points by 1985 (from 66.1% to 57.3%), 2.4

constructed in early 1975, the intermedi
ate projection of

While

the total rail share of coal production

1985.

Now, however,

The FSP notwithstanding, we have,

in October, 1976, no more definitive

we categorize this as a high-side
754

information about the future level of coal

(Table 5 continued)

production and the mode of transport than
Project Independence
(unadjusted)

was available in October of 1973.

1980

1985

627

792

TABLE 4
ACTUAL AND FORECASTED PRODUCTION
AND RAIL ORIGINATIONS OF COAL: 1964-1985
(Millions of Tons)

For 1980, there is a forecast range from
488 to 627 million tons; for 1985, the
spread is from 510 to 792 million tons.
If one throws out the Project Independence

COAL
PRODUCTION

NATIONAL
RAIL
ORIGI
NATIONS

RAIL ORIGI
NATIONS AS
A PERCENT OF
PRODUCTION

alternative, the range is narrowed greatly
— from 488 to 532 in 1980 and from 510 to
659 in 1985.

It should be mentioned that

1964

509

357.7

70.3

1973

590

376.1

63.8

recession in 1978.

1974

594

390.9

65.8

estimate for rail originations (488

1980

738

487.9

6 6 . 1

1985

1,028

589.0

57.3

Source:

See (6 ).

the FSP forecast incorporated a mild
Thus explains the low

million tons) in 1980.
The present study utilizes a quarterly
rail sector model which can be simulated

The range of possible coal production

for the purpose of evaluating alternative

estimates was summarized above.

coal scenarios.

Table 5

In simulating rail

freight demand over the period from 1976

contains alternative estimates of
national rail originations of coal.

to 1985, we have used the long-term fore

For

cast of economic activity produced by Data

example, the coal production figure
provided by the Bureau of Mines (BOM) for

Resources Incorporated.

1985 is 998 million tons of coal.

scenario incorporates a sustained economic

The

This basic

unadjusted estimate of rail originations

rebound beginning in 1975, with a

of coal based on this production figure

temporary slowdown in the rate of real

is 659 million tons; it assumes no change

growth in 1978.

in rail market share (i.e., it stays at

for rail freight demand were generated;

the 1974 level of approximately

6 6

Six separate simulations

the forecast results are summarized in

%).

Table

The adjusted BOM production series

6

.

incorporates, however, a continuously

TABLE

declining rail market share after 1980

PROJECTIONS OF RAIL VOLUME GROWTH
BASED ON ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES
OF COAL PRODUCTION*

and produces a 1985 rail originations
projection of 571 million tons of coal.

6

(billions of ton-miles)
TABLE 5
RAIL TONNAGE ORIGINATIONS OF COAL
(Millions)

Low Growth
Final System Plan
(adjusted)
Bureau of Mines (adjusted)
Bureau of Mines
(unadjusted)
Project Independence
(adjusted)

1980
510

1985
510

488
532

589
571

532

659

589

624
755

1975

1980

1985

Bur. of Mines
Unadjusted
Adjusted

753
753

996
996

1,209
1,173

Project Indep.
Unadjusted
Adjusted

753
753

1,032
1,018

1,261
1,194

Final System Plan

753

979

1,181

Low Growth

753

986

1,146

interconnect rail volume and needed rail

(Table 6 continued)
*The production categories listed in this
table are defined in Table 3. It should
be noted that the ton-mile estimates
shown above for the Final System Plan
(next-to-last row) reflect only the coal
volume estimates contained in the Final
System Plan. All other forecast inputs
are taken from the long-term outlook
provided by Data Resources, Inc. Thus
the variation in long-term estimates is
due solely to coal.

equipment.
TABLE 7
ESTIMATED COST OF NEEDED
OPEN HOPPER CARS FOR PROJECTED
RAIL ORIGINATIONS OF COAL
(billions of dollars)
Production
Estimate*

Looking at the forecast results shown in
Table

6

Low Growth
Final System
Plan
Bur. of Mines
Ad j .
Bur. of Mines
Unadj.
Proj. Indep.
Ad j .
Proj. Indep.
Unadj.

, it is obvious that the volume

of coal production will have a tremendous
impact on ton-miles of rail freight.
Starting from the depressed 1975 level of
7 5 3

billion ton-miles, the rail model

yields a forecast range for 1980 from 979
billion to 1,032 billion ton-miles, while
the comparable range for 1985 is from
Taking the 1980 projection of 996 billion
and the 1985 estimate of 1,209 billion
ton-miles (both based on the latest
estimate of coal production from the
Bureau of Mines), this produces a
compound rate of growth of 5.8 percent
between 1975 and 1980 and 4 percent be
tween 1980 and 1985, both of which are
quite high when compared to the secular
1 . 6

percent highlighted

in Table 1.
3.

1981-1985

Total

$3.9

$3.5

$ 7.4

3.6

5.2

8 . 8

4.3

4.3

8 . 6

4.3

5.9

1 0 . 2

5.2

4.5

9.7

5.8

7.2

13.0

*See Table 3 for definitions of
production categories. There are a
number of variables which must be
considered in developing open hopper car
requirements.
Based on an average load
factor of 8 6 tons per car in 1974, we
have estimated load factors of 91 and 96
tons per car in 1980 and 1985, respec
tively.
In addition, we have incorpo
rated improvement in the average turn
around time for coal cars.
In particu
lar, we have projected that incremental
coal cars will achieve 28 trips per
year by 1980 and 30 trips per year by
1985 (this compares with an average of
12.5 trips per year in 1974). This
improvement reflects increased usage of
unit trains. Financial estimates are
based on a 1976 price of $38,000 for a
1 0 0 -ton,
rapid discharge open top hopper.
Price is projected to increase 5% per
year.

1,146 billion to 1,261 billion ton-miles.

growth rate of

1975-1980

FINANCING THE COAL BOOM:
HOW MANY HOPPER CARS?

The alternative estimates of coal ton-

The figures in Table 7 do serve to

age originations (see Table 5) can be
translated into various financial

illustrate the tremendous financial
impact of a coal-centered energy policy

projections.

on the rail sector.

Table 7 contains a fore

For some perspective,

cast of expenditures for the open hopper

consider that in 1974 net operating

cars which will be required by the

income for Class I railroads was less

higher volume of coal traffic.

than one billion dollars ( 1 ) .

Needless

If one

to say, this forecast of capital

takes the most conservative hopper car

requirements should be viewed as a rough

projection of $7.4 billion over the ten-

barometer of the order of magnitude,

year period from 1975 to 1985, this

since there are a number of variables

implies over $700 million a year for

(load per car, trips per car per year,

open hoppers.

system capacity, etc.) which
756

Clearly, part of this

money will be raised by public utilities

Prior to 1973, very few economists, poli

and other customers who will buy their

ticians, railroaders, or truckers would

own coal cars.

have been willing to predict a rail

Even if one divides the

original figure of $7.4 billion by, say,

renaissance.

a factor of three to reflect financing

has wrenched the economy.

external to the industry and to adjust

raised the possibility of a rail resur

for any upward bias in the projections,

gence, it has simultaneously made the

the rail industry still needs close to

rail sector much more dependent on

$250 million a year to finance coal car

federal policy.

purchases.

This completely ignores the

President Ford have urged the nation to

the accelerated maintenance resulting from

achieve energy independence by 1985,

the rapid growth in unit coal trains.

very little has been accomplished in that

Open hopper cars do have some alternative

direction.

uses, but such potential growth in the

In fact, we have regressed—

foreign oil now comprises nearly forty

hopper car fleet will make the rail

percent of our total oil usage.

industry much more susceptible to policy

While

the federal government has usurped the

A large

leadership role in the national energy

percentage of the coal cars purchased in

arena, it has developed no substantive

1985 will still be in service at the turn
of the century.

While it has

Although both former President Nixon and

needed capital investment for roadbed and

"quirks" in the energy area.

The Arab embargo, however,

energy plan in the three years since the

Thus the rail industry's

oil embargo.

present perception of current and future

As a result of this plan

ning vacuum, the freight transportation

energy policies will be "built" into the

sector desperately needs clarification

rail fleet for an extended time period.

from the federal government on the

Referring back to the coal tonnage

following issues:

projections for rail traffic outlined in

(1) Does this nation propose to

Table 5, it appears that the moderate

reduce— totally or partially— its

level of coal growth most likely to

dependence on foreign oil by
1985?

occur by 1985 will not place a severe
strain on the physical capacity of the
rail system.

(2) What role will coal (as well as

Rather, the focus should

be on the financial ability of the rail

all other fuels) play in this

road and utility industries to raise

national energy plan?

large sums of money for rail car
expansion.

(3) Will the federal government

Looking beyond 1985, one

support recent proposals to grant

must be cognizant of the inflexibility

the right of eminent domain to

that such a rapid increase in coal car

slurry pipelines?

ownership imposes upon both the railroads
and the utilities.

(4) The inflated demand for low

Given the nature of

sulphur coal has produced a surge

regulated pricing in these two industries,

in business for Western railroads.

the increased cost of coal cars will be

Will the Environmental Protection

built into the cost structure, regardless

Agency maintain its present

of the level of coal car utilization.
4.

sulphur emission guidelines?

AN AGENDA FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION

(5) Will the federal government favor
757

the development of Eastern coal

permits the development of slurry pipe

in order to keep ConRail profit

lines, and, at the same time, encourages
rail development, what guarantees, if any,

able?

will be (should be) provided to the rail

It can be argued that the Project Inde

industry?

pendence estimates are no longer feasible
as a target level for government energy

Assuming that the nation does develop a

policy.

coal-centered energy policy and that the

Even if it is impossible to hit

the target of

rail industry maintains its present

million tons of coal

1 , 2 0 0

in 1985, the current political environ

dominance in coal transport, will the

ment continues to focus on the need for

coal come from the East or the West?

energy independence.

Historically, coal production has been

Both President Ford

to reduce the potential impact of another

concentrated in the East. With the
advent of sulphur emission guidelines by

oil embargo by developing alternative

the Environmental Protection Agency,

energy sources.

however, an artificial demand has develop

and Jimmy Carter have urged the country

Energy companies and

spending billions of dollars to handle

ed for low sulphur coal (mined mainly in
Wyoming). Concern for the environment

this future onslaught of coal production.

might dictate, therefore, an energy

There is already ample evidence of labor

policy which boasts strong Western rail

and equipment shortages in the coal

roads such as Union Pacific and

railroads are, in fact, currently

mining industry.

Burlington Northern.

On the other hand,

The federal govern

there is no guarantee (or even a well-

ment's interest in keeping ConRail

thought-out-argument) that the United

profitable, however, may yield an energy

States could utilize 1,200 million tons

plan which favors Eastern coal.

of coal in 1985.

The analysis in this article supports the

Work done by Chase

Econometrics Inc. suggests that, due to

possibility of a rail renaissance in

the declining growth rate of steel

conjunction with a surge in coal produc

production (smaller cars) and due to the

tion.

The growth scenarios outlined in

lower growth rate for high-priced

Table

electricity, coal production will be

which is a complete reversal of the rail

under 900 million tons in 1985 (6 ).

If

6

display a pattern of increase

stagnation experienced during the postwar

one accepts the position that the near-

period.

term growth of coal is limited by demand

Table 7, however, are sobering when one

forces, the rail sector may be, in fact,

considers the past earnings history of

in the process of developing massive

the railroad industry.

excess capacity.

tremendous uncertainty which permeates

The financial needs outlined in

Given the

The mere presence of a federal coal

current transportation planning, it is

production target in 1985 (whether it is

apparent that the future of the rail

1,200 million tons or 900 million tons)

system is intrically interwoven with the

does not eradicate a fundamental rail

maze of policy decisions still to be made

planning problem:

in the energy and transportation domains.

To what degree will

the federal government rely on the rail
road industry to move future coal
production?

If the federal government
758
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